

## LEISURE AND PLAY IN ARISTOTLE'S IDEAL STATE

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In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle declares: *δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι*<sup>1)</sup> and uses this proposition to decide that man's highest happiness lies in the contemplative rather than in the active life. In the last books of the Politics the law-giver, deeply concerned as he has to be about the happiness of the citizens, must realize that leisure is an important phase of their life and must provide suitable occupations for it (for leisure is certainly not = idleness). A few other passages in Aristotle's work help us to reconstruct his concept of *σχολή* and to define its place more precisely but none of them equals in importance the discussions in the Nicomachean Ethics and in the last books of the Politics.

What Aristotle actually says about *σχολή* is not particularly difficult to understand. The difficulties begin when we try to determine where the accents lie and how far his doctrines represent a new departure. Here much remains to be done, even after the valuable, and in some ways pioneering, contributions of J. L. Stocks<sup>2)</sup> and Ernst Koller<sup>3)</sup>. Both of them have given us helpful analyses of Aristotle's doctrines and Koller's very learned study provides, in addition, some of the badly needed historical background but on the question of Aristotle's originality neither of the two scholars seems to me to have come to the right conclusions. For Stocks certainly goes too far when he asserts (without proof) that Aristotle owes to Plato the division of human life into the three phases: *παιδεία, ἀσχολία, σχολή*<sup>4)</sup>, while Koller in his frequent com-

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1) Eth. Nic. X, 7.1177 b 4; cf. b 4—18, 22.

2) „*Σχολή*“, Cl. Q. 30 (1936), 177—187.

3) *Muße und musische Paideia. Über die Musikaporetik in der aristotel. Politik*, Mus. Helv., 13 (1956), 1—37; 94—124.

4) loc. cit. 180. Curious too and unacceptable is Stocks' opinion (loc. cit. 183) that *σχολή* is "something of a stranger to the Platonic and to the Aristotelian conceptual system."

parisons of the σχολή motif in the city of Plato's *Laws* and in Aristotle's best state<sup>5)</sup> does not bring out what different connotations and how different a place σχολή has in these two works. Many years earlier, John Burnet had gone to another extreme<sup>6)</sup>. Availing himself of the incomplete condition of the *Politics*, he assumed that the σχολή of the citizens must in Aristotle's intention have corresponded to that of the Lyceum and must have been meant to include a thorough-going course of philosophical studies. As for the *Ethics*, it is a delight to see how generously the two most recent commentaries<sup>7)</sup> supply information about the antecedents of Aristotle's doctrines; many topics can now for the first time be studied in the correct, i. e. the Greek perspective — but σχολή has unfortunately not yet profited from this approach. Gauthier and Jolif<sup>8)</sup> try to connect Aristotle's views on σχολή with Plato's pessimistic belief that man's entire life is a "play" and he himself a παίγιον of God<sup>9)</sup>. With the best of will, it is not possible to regard this connection as valid. If we merely wish to know the reasons for Aristotle's own interest in σχολή we may find them in a brief note appended to Ernest Barker's English translation of the *Politics*<sup>10)</sup>; for Barker here states clearly why σχολή is so valuable a phase in the citizen's life. One of our questions will be whether Aristotle was the first to assign it this value. It may however be well to begin with a resumé of what Book

5) *op. cit.*; see esp. 36 f. Cf. below p. 207.

6) Aristotle on Education (Cambridge, 1913), esp. 134 ff.

7) Aristoteles. *Nikomachische Ethik übers.* von Franz Dirlmeier (2nd ed., Berlin, 1960) and Aristote. *L'Éthique à Nicomaque...* par R. E. Gauthier, O. P., et J. Y. Jolif, O. P. (3 vols., Paris, Louvain, 1958—59).

8) *op. cit.* II, 867 ff.

9) *Legg.* VII, 803 b ff. For the motif as such see now Hans Herter, *Bonner Jahrbücher* 161 (1961) 73 ff. Cf. also G. J. De Vries, *Spel bij Plato* (Amsterdam, 1949) 22 ff.

10) *The Politics of Aristotle translated...* by Ernest Barker (Oxford, 1946, American ed. 1958) 323 Note GGG. — E. C. Welskopf's stimulating book *Probleme der Muße im alten Hellas* (Berlin, 1962), with which I became acquainted after this paper was written, combines a study of social and economic conditions with a scrutiny of the texts. Her approach is essentially critical and ideological but there is no lack of genuine historical insights; she seems to me to have a firmer grasp of Aristotle's thought than Sebastian de Grazia in the first chapter of his book *On Time, Work and Leisure* (written for and published by The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1962, 11—33) where there is far too much speculative reconstruction and too little analysis.

VII teaches us about the place of this concept in Aristotle's scheme of human values.

In the first chapters of the books (Politics VII and VIII) devoted to the best constitution Aristotle ties the ἀρίστη πολιτεία closely to the ἀριστος or αἰρετώτατος βίος. This makes it of fundamental importance to define the "best life" correctly. It must be the life in which the goods of the soul are given the proper preference over the "outward goods" <sup>11)</sup>. The goods of the soul are the excellences (ἀρεταί) and thus we may agree εἶτι ἐκάστω εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως (and of activity in accordance with these) <sup>12)</sup>. That the happiness of an individual and that of a community are one and the same may also be regarded as settled. To be sure, εὐδαιμονία, even if thus based on the excellences, is still capable of several conflicting definitions. In Aristotle's discussion of these differing definitions — or to put it more adequately, of these differing convictions and attitudes adopted by his contemporaries — two problems emerge which have a bearing on σχολή. An individual life and a city whose goal it is "to rule and be master over the neighbours at all costs" <sup>13)</sup> cannot be the best, and since such a life would consist of conquest and involve warfare, it follows that the practice of a warrior's excellence cannot be the "end"; nor can it be the content of ζωὴ ἀγαθὴ and εὐδαιμονία <sup>14)</sup>. Imperialism being thus rejected, another extreme view presents itself for discussion and is likewise found unacceptable. For this view happiness consists in a withdrawal from political activity; those who hold this view are likely to prefer intellectual pursuits (θεωρία) <sup>15)</sup>. We may sympathize with such a withdrawal in so far as it springs from a disgust with the injustice and with the subjugation of others held to be inevitable concomitants of political action. But Aristotle is not willing to accept this defense of the βίος θεωρητικός; against the attempts to exalt it he uses, or rather endorses,

11) Pol. VII, 1.1223 a 19—b 18.

12) Ibid. b 21 ff.

13) VII, 2.1324 b 22 ff. The discussion of the two major problems begins 1324 a 13.

14) 1325 a 5—7. For Aristotle's return to the subject of the warrior's excellences see below p. 198.

15) VII, 3. Note the reference to the βίος θεωρητικός in 2.1324 a 28 f.

the argument that εὐπραξία cannot consist in ἀπρακτεῖν. It must be a πράξις<sup>16</sup>). However, having embarked on this argument, Aristotle very soon gives the concept of πράξις so broad a meaning that it includes also intellectual activities<sup>17</sup>). For intellectual activity has εὐπραξία for its end and is therefore a πράξις. And since the deity and the Cosmos are cited as entities that have happiness without engaging in "external" actions we must understand that the βίος θεωρητικός is after all a valid form of happiness. All this is entirely convincing, especially if we remember that Aristotle's god has no activity other than thinking — yet is this really what Aristotle set out to prove? Did he mean to argue for or against the βίος θεωρητικός? Has he forgotten that his subject is politics? We have to accept the oscillations of Aristotle's argument and the ambiguity of his conclusion; they are indicative of a deeper conflict between diverging tendencies and inclinations of his mind<sup>18</sup>).

In chapter 9 of this Book, where some classes of inhabitants are considered as qualified and others as not qualified for citizen status, we read that none who by his occupation is debarred from practicing *arete* should be a citizen, a stipulation which inter alios disqualifies the farmers because δεῖ σχολῆς πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς<sup>19</sup>). We shall in the sequel

16) Ibid. 1325 a 31. For what follows see Dirlmeier (cf. n. 7) 594 f.

17) See *ibid.* 1325 b 16—30, esp. 18—21, 27—30.

18) We cannot assume that the conclusion (1325 b 30; the best kind of life must be one and the same for the individual and the city as a whole) ignores the last arguments. Perhaps it implies a commitment to the justified claims of the βίος θεωρητικός. Willy Theiler, *Mus. Helv.* 9 (1952), 69 ff. considers VII, 2 f. a later addition by Aristotle's own hand to the original proem contained in ch. 1. His arguments are less than cogent and I cannot admit more than a possibility. See also below n. 21.

19) VII, 9.1329 a 1. σχολή as here used has however not quite the specific Aristotelian meaning which interests us in this paper. To have "time" (σχολή) for political activities means not to be tied down to the need of earning one's living (cf. *Isocr.* 7.26 etc.). But the σχολή insisted upon by Aristotle in *Politics* VII and VIII is "leisure" from private as well as from political obligations — and for the καλὰ. For the correct understanding of Aristotle's new departures it is essential to keep the two meanings distinct; (cf. the admirable discussion of Welskopf *op. cit.* 233 ff., 239). σχολή for political activities is often referred to in the "middle books", e. g. in IV. 6 (1292 b 32, 36, 1293 a 5 etc.) and in V, 11 (1313 b 20 etc.). Stocks (whose list of passages for σχολή in the "middle books" is neither accurate nor com-

learn more about the necessity of leisure. After some chapters specifying for the best city requirements to which the topic of leisure is hardly germane, we return in chapter 13 to the *πολιτεία αὐτή* and to the end which it must pursue; i. e. to *εὐδαιμονία*, εὖ ζῆν, and by way of these also to the *ἀρετή* of the citizens. The realization of their *ἀρετή* depends in large measure on the education which they receive, and for the education the law-giver has to make the right provisions (τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον)<sup>20</sup>). How is the law-giver to proceed? He must be guided by the right, i. e. Aristotelian or Academic, psychology and must know that there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the other which while irrational is yet capable of being directed by reason. Both parts have their specific actions (*πράξεις*) but the actions of the rational soul part are decidedly the better, because this part itself is better. Having set forth this division of the soul, Aristotle turns to the *βίος* of man which he declares is similarly "divided": διήρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ εἰς σχολήν, καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρήνην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα, τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλὰ<sup>21</sup>). Between each two opposites there is the same qualitative relationship — or as Aristotle puts it, the same *ἄρσεις* — as between the two soul parts and their actions. This means that war is to be chosen for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, necessary things for the sake of noble things. The first of these

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plete) ignores the difference between the two meanings and as a result misinterprets the evidence. What matters is not that *σχολή*, *σχολάζεσθαι* etc. occur more rarely in these books than in VII and VIII but that *σχολή* in the specific and new sense of leisure for *τὰ καλὰ* does not occur. The simplest explanation is that since Aristotle in the middle books is not dealing with ideal conditions he has no occasion to speak of *σχολή* in this sense. The different attitude to leisure in the two sets of books is not in itself a good argument for assigning VII and VIII to an earlier period of Aristotle's thought (Welskopf 209 rightly says this against E. Mikkola *Arctos* nov. ser. 2, 1957, 66 ff. and I should say the same against Stocks 182 ff., whose paper neither she nor Mikkola seems to know.).

20) VII, 14.1333 a 14 ff. Ch. 12 recommends two *ἀγοραί* for the city, one for the *ἀναγκαῖα*, the other for *σχολή*.

21) Ibid. a 30. Theiler, loc. cit. (Note 18) 71 tries to prove that VII, 14 and 15 are later additions to the original stock of the *ἀρίστη πολιτεία*. But the disquisition about *σχολή*, *ἀσχολία* and related concepts in VII, 14 cannot be missed. VIII, 2 (which Theiler himself regards as original) takes up the points made in VII, 14 (with a reference back 1337 b 30) to develop them.



statements is a reaffirmation of what Plato says in the *Laws* <sup>22</sup>). The second: ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς (ἔνεκεν αἰρετέον) is the new and Aristotelian motif. The introduction of this principle is bound to have very far reaching consequences and to give the entire theory of the best state a new orientation. In a but slightly altered form Aristotle states the thought again a few lines later: δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην ἀγειν καὶ σχολάζειν <sup>23</sup>). This principle must serve as "goal" (σκοποί) for the education of children as well as of other age groups, although the prevailing practice, when examined in the light of this principle, is seen to produce most unsatisfactory results. For the ἀρεταί at whose realization the cities actually aim are of a lower order, and some political programs show an undue admiration of Sparta and its political system whose only aim is the fostering of the warlike virtues. Cities of the kind, as Aristotle here (and also later on) observes, do well as long as they are engaged in war but fail when the time comes to cultivate their gains in peace. "This is the fault of the law-giver who has not educated them to be able to live in leisure" <sup>24</sup>).

Chapter VII, 15 continues along the lines of the preceding chapters but gives increased attention to the excellences appropriate to leisure. Bearing in mind simultaneously the opposition of ἀσχολία and σχολή and of war and peace, Aristotle assigns courage and endurance (καρτερία) to ἀσχολία, φιλοσοφία — probably in the broadest sense of the word — to σχολή, and two other important excellences, moderation and justice, to both, observing however that they are even more needed in times of "peace and leisure" <sup>25</sup>). In this chapter the concept of leisure is kept very closely associated with that of peace; it almost looks as though Aristotle who introduced the relation between ἀσχολία and σχολή as paralleling that between war and peace had not yet succeeded in giving σχολή its own separate scope and substance (this impression would however not be borne out by Book VIII). We may conclude our study of Book VII by quoting one more emphatic affirmation from

22) Legg. 625 c—630 c (628 d) etc.; see below pp. 209 f. Cf. H. Fuchs, *Augustin und der antike Friedensgedanke* (Berlin, 1926) 135 ff., *Mus. Helv.* 12 (1955), 203 f.; Koller, loc. cit. 15 ff.

23) 1333 a 33 ff., 41 ff.

24) 1333 b 5 ff., 1334 a 7 ff., 15.1334 a 36 ff.

25) 15.1334 a 18—36.

chapter 15: αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι ἀγαθούς, εἰρήνην δ' ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδώδεις<sup>26</sup>). Needless to say, it is once more the admired Spartan way of life whose shortcomings are here exposed<sup>27</sup>). In Aristotle's own city it is certainly axiomatic that the citizens through their education acquire the excellences that are essential for leisure. Book VIII has much to say on this subject.

But before we go on to Book VIII we may as well take up some broader historical questions. What interests us particularly is whether the appreciation of σχολή that we find in Politics VII and VIII is a reflection of the esteem which it enjoyed in the philosophical schools (especially in the Academy and the Lyceum) and whether Aristotle in these books uses the philosopher's kind of life as a model for the citizen's. Quite certainly the philosopher needs leisure; and quite certainly σχολή was in the Academy and the Lyceum cherished as an essential condition for fruitful θεωρία. But if there is evidence to suggest that this appreciation was not confined to the philosophers, we should think twice before we assume that the important place given to σχολή in the best city of Politics VII and VIII is to be understood simply and solely as a reflection of its importance in the philosophical βίος. Our starting point in this historical excursus should not be the archaic period during which ἡσυχία was accepted as an integral part and value of life — especially of the aristocratic life<sup>28</sup>) — but rather the historical situation at the end of the fifth century when under increased pressures and owing to a changed pace of things ἡσυχία was no longer to be found. In a superficial sense σχολή succeeds to the place of ἡσυχία. But the word bears a different accent. The desire for σχολή springs from a different and deeper psychological need.

When Ion in Euripides' play finds himself to his utter surprise presented with the prospect of exchanging his simple

26 Ibid. 36 ff.

27) See II, 9.1271b3 for a similar observation about the defects of the Spartan νόμοι. Throughout the discussion of the Spartan and the Carthaginian constitution (II, 9.11) σχολή is an important qualitative criterion. Quite logically both of the meanings explained in n. 19 figure in Aristotle's critical appraisals.

28) For ἡσυχία see Koller, op. cit. 20f. and E. C. Welskopf's book (above N. 10).

life in Delphi for a princely existence in Athens he hesitates to accept this new status and takes stock of the good things (*ἀγαθὰ*, v. 633) that he would have to renounce. The first place among these goes to leisure to which he refers as *τὴν φιλτάτην ἀνθρώποις σχολήν*<sup>29</sup>). If we look carefully at the next lines which develop this preference for a life of *σχολή* we realize that its opposite is no longer the specious glamor of life at a tyrant's court but *ῥχλος* — probably in the sense of "crowd" — and the unpleasant situation of being "pushed off the road" (to be taken literally but perhaps not only so) by people of inferior worth (*κακίονες*)<sup>30</sup>). Such apprehensions are hardly natural for a "tyrant's" son. We have probably to admit that Ion speaks somewhat "out of turn"<sup>31</sup>) but the light which his words throw on *σχολή* may be all the more revealing. *σχολή* is here associated with quiet happiness and a kind of contemplative enjoyment; it is opposed to politics, *πόνου* (including, it would seem financial worries), and the hustling and bustling of city life<sup>32</sup>). To put the matter for once in modern terms, the choice is between losing one's soul and preserving it<sup>33</sup>).

Euripides may well be ahead of his time. He may have given a clear articulation to what with most of his con-

29) Eur., Ion 634 (*ἀνθρώπων* codd.: *ἀνθρώποις* Wilamowitz). I do not of course dispute that a Greek could at any time — and presumably long before Euripides — say that he had or did not have *σχολή* for this or that.

30) Ibid. 635 ff. The *ῥχλος* motif that we find here and in Xenophon may bring to mind the relation between otium and turba in Seneca, ep. mor. 7.1 and elsewhere (cf. A. J. Festugière, *Personal Religion among the Greeks*, Sather Class. Lectures 26, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954, 59 f.). But the Roman idea of otium, while indebted to the *σχολή* concept which we are studying, has many peculiar nuances, and Seneca in particular discovered new aspects of it that require careful analysis. See on otium e. g. E. Bernert, *Würzburger Jhb. 1947*, 89 ff. and Miriam T. Griffin, *J. R. St. 52* (1962) 111 ff.

31) Cf. Wilamowitz, *Euripides Ion* (Berlin, 1926) 15.

32) Ion 625—632. In Euripides Antiope Amphion stands for the βίος *θεωρητικός*. From the fragments we can see that he expressed his aversion to the *ῥχλος* and the *πολυπραγμοσύνη* of political life (frag. 193—202 Nauck; IIB von Arnim) but I find no evidence that Euripides *expressis verbis* associated βίος *θεωρητικός* and *σχολή*.

33) See vv. 642—644. The passages presently to be quoted from Xenophon will show that to speak of „soul“ is not a gratuitous modernization. Since there is a tendency today to emphasize or overemphasize the "economic basis" of leisure in Greece, we may note that for Ion *σχολή* would also be an escape from the troublesome obligations connected with wealth (vv. 629—632).



temporaries was a vague yearning. Still in the balance it is probable that such a longing for the quiet of leisure was shared by some portion of the Athenians and that the emotional need for leisure and a withdrawal into privacy had developed in reaction to the exhausting worries and tensions of the Peloponnesian War<sup>34</sup>). Life in Athens must have been (to put it mildly) restless in the years when the *Ion* was written. Flight from the πολυπραγμοσύνη of Athenian civic life is after all the theme of the *Birds*. In any case the passage suffices as evidence that a longing for, and appreciation of, σχολή antedates the founding of the Academy by about a quarter of a century<sup>35</sup>).

With the next item of evidence, a passage of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, we are well within the fourth century but the testimony of the passage is nevertheless valuable, especially in view of the fact that it seems to be untouched by philosophy in any technical sense of the word (there is nothing in it that I would call "Socratic"). It will be best to let the passage speak for itself; it embodies thoughts presenting themselves to Cyrus' mind while, having gone from success to success, he is engaged in organizing his government: εἰ. τοιοῦτον ἔσται τὸ μέγαρα πράττειν ὥστε μὴ οἶόν τε εἶναι μήτε ἀμφ' αὐτὸν σχολὴν ἔχειν μήτε μετὰ τῶν φίλων εὐφρανθῆναι, ἐγὼ μὲν χαίρειν ταύτην τῆν εὐδαιμονίαν κελεύω. . . . εἰ οὖν τις τούτοις (scil. the numerous people desirous for an audience and thereby troublesome) ὑπέξει ἑαυτὸν, λογίζομαι μικρὸν μὲν τι ὑμῖν (the friends) μέρος ἐμοῦ μετεσόμενον, μικρὸν δέ τι ἐμοὶ ὑμῶν. ἑμαυτοῦ μέντοι σαφῶς οἶδ' ὅτι οὐδ' ὅτι οὖν μοι μετέσται<sup>36</sup>). The next sentences

34) In Eur. *Hipp.* 384 and Sophocles frg. 287 N. σχολή appears in a considerably less favorable light and is closer in meaning to idleness. The psychological reasons suggested in the text may well have caused a change in attitude and valuation.

35) I am aware that the year of the *Ion* is not "established" (nor indeed is that of the founding of the Academy). A. S. Owen (*Euripides Ion*, Oxford, 1939, XXXVI) pays far too little attention to structural similarities between the *Ion* and other plays. See on this subject my paper in *Hermes* 69 (1934) 390 ff. Kjeld Matthiessen, *Aufbau und Datierung der „Electra“* etc., Diss. Hamburg, 1961, 157 ff. is critical of some of my conclusions. In the light of what he and others have recently written I think that there is a need for reexamining these conclusions. I hope to return to the subject in the near future. Albin Lesky, *Gesch. d. griech. Lit.* 367 ff. seems to be close to my original position, and I believe that few would now consider a date before 415.

36) *Instit. Cyri* VII, 5.42.

present again a picture of people "pushing", or elbowing, one another out of the way to find their place in the sun, to be close to the top, and to advance their interests<sup>37</sup>). One additional sentence must be quoted: νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁ φιλοπονώτατος πόλεμος ἀναπέπαιται, δοκεῖ μοι καὶ ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ ἀναπαύσεώς τινος ἀξιούσιν τυγχάνειν<sup>38</sup>). Here as in the *Ion* the conditions contrasting with *σχολή* come under the headings of *ῥυθλος*, *πόννοι*, and political rivalries; what is this time brought out more clearly (but was by no means absent in the *Ion*) is the essential connection between *σχολή* and *εὐδαιμονία*. Other characteristic motifs to be noted are the association of leisure and relaxation (*σχολή* and *ἀνάπαυσις*) and the importance of finding time for one's friends and enjoying *σχολή* in their company. — And since the *Ion* passage also suggests a certain incompatibility between *σχολή* and *πλοῦτος* — for a life spent in worries about the administration of one's possessions cannot be conducive to *σχολή* —, we may record that the *Cyropaideia* contains the story of Pheraulas, a friend of Cyrus, who on the basis of a pact hands over all his possessions present and future to a newly won Scian friend, being happy by this device to rid himself of all „troubles" (*πράγματα*) and to be assured of *σχολή* henceforth<sup>39</sup>).

For Euripides it might be argued that his personal inclinations made him partial to a life of withdrawal and privacy<sup>40</sup>) (but it would still be unwise to find in the *Ion* passage no more than a confession or reflection of personal preferences). In Xenophon's case no such argument is available, and since he wrote the *Cyropaideia* while in exile and while leading a sufficiently private existence, the passages discussed are unlikely to project his own personal and individual idiosyncrasies. In fact, Xenophon's statements may in some sense be more representative than the passage of the *Ion*; for what Cyrus and his friend long for is not a life spent in *σχολή* but some hours of relief and relaxation.

Still another passage in Xenophon may be illuminating for our purposes and may even take us a step farther; for it

37) *Ibid.* 45.

38) *Ibid.* 47. See also 48—54 and 55—57 (emphasis on privacy).

At VIII, 1.13—15 Cyrus finds an „organizational" solution for his problem.

39) VIII, 3.35—50. Cf. Eur., *Ion* 629—632 and my comments above Note 33.

40) cf. the (presumably characteristic) anecdotes in Satyrus col. IX and Gell. XV, 20.5.

seems to suggest that when the desirability of leisure had become — more or less widely — recognized thoughtful people began to wonder about the best ‘occupation’ for their leisure hours and to distinguish between the more and the less valuable ways of spending their σχολή. Instances of the less valuable occupation are dice playing and buffoonery; for the better occupation no illustration is provided. Unfortunately the passage<sup>41)</sup> is somewhat obscure. Someone — and quite probably Xenophon himself — seems to have garbled the argument, stultifying its original point or points<sup>42)</sup>. Tentatively and with all due reservation we may reconstruct an original “Socratic” conversation proceeding along such lines as these: Socrates: “What is leisure?” The interlocutor: “The time when people do nothing.” Socrates: “Do nothing? I find that everybody does something in what he calls his leisure. Some play dice, others engage in buffoonery. Is it not evident that all these people do something? . . . May one nevertheless call this their leisure because each of them would have leisure to turn to something better?” (this we may suppose to be the view which Socrates favors) . . . “But what if people actually do something better? Would they too have leisure to turn from the better occupation to one less good?” Here the answer would be negative; for in truth a man has no “leisure” to turn from the better to the worse<sup>43)</sup>. But if he has no such leisure

41) Memor. 3.9.9: σχολήν δὲ σκοπῶν, τί εἴη, ποιῶντας μὲν τι τοὺς πλείστους εὐρίσκειν ἔφη. καὶ γὰρ τοὺς πεττεύοντας καὶ τοὺς γελωτοποιῶντας ποιεῖν τι· πάντας δὲ τούτους ἔφη σχολάζειν· ἐξεῖναι γὰρ αὐτοῖς λέναί πράξοντας τὰ βελτίω τούτων. ἀπὸ μὲντοι τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπὶ τὰ χεῖρω λέναί οὐδένα σχολάζειν· εἰ δὲ τις ἴοι, τοῦτον ἀσχολίας αὐτῷ οὐσης κακῶς ἔφη τοῦτο πράττειν.

42) „höchst unklare Formulierung“ is O. Gigon’s comment on this section (Komment. zum Ersten Buch von Xen. Memorabilien, Basel, 1953, 87). Gigon compares mem. 1.2.57 where Socrates upholds the view that only he who does something valuable may truthfully be said to “work”, whereas whoever does something harmful should be called “idle” (ἄργοι). I am not sure how much may be learned from a comparison of the two passages; the safe minimal inference would be that idleness and leisure must be valued altogether differently. On ἀργία and σχολή cf. Franz Boll, *Vita contemplativa* (Sitzungsber. Heidelb. Akad. 11, 1920) 30.

43) In Plato’s *Phaedrus* (229e3, 4) Socrates says that he has no σχολή for the rationalistic interpretation of myths. His mind is absorbed by the endeavour to “know himself” (in accordance with the Delphic command), certainly a task of greater intrinsic value. For another instance of no σχολή for inferior occupations see Resp. VI, 500b8. Dice-playing is set apart from worthier forms of σχολή also in Legg. VII, 820c.

he would be in a condition of ἀσχολία . . . We cannot of course hope to reconstruct the actual development of the dialogue in Xenophon's source<sup>44</sup>) but from what Xenophon has preserved it appears that the dialectic of the σχολή concept had begun to be developed so that different conceptions of it could be played off against one another (a good Socratic pattern which we know from many Platonic dialogues). Whether σχολή in itself had connotations incompatible with the idea of passing to less valuable occupations or whether Socrates had to use specific arguments against such waste of time and of intellectual resources is an intriguing question on which I do not dare to express an opinion<sup>45</sup>). The differentiation made in this section between better and inferior occupations contains the germ of Aristotle's distinctions between σχολή which is to be put to "constructive" use and παιδιά whose purpose is confined to relaxation<sup>46</sup>).

Whatever we may think of the passages quoted from Euripides and Xenophon and whatever qualifications as to their "representative" character we may wish to make, we have certainly no right to ignore them. They give us some historical perspective on σχολή as we find it cultivated and exalted by the philosophical schools. What the philosophers did was not to discover the value or necessity of σχολή but, to continue in the terms of the last Xenophon passage, to provide the best content for a σχολή the need for which was felt by many. When Aristotle in the famous chapter X, 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, while working up to his final pronouncement on human happiness, declares (1177 b 4) δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι we should beware of inter-

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44) Analytical studies of the *Memorabilia* have assumed extensive use on Xenophon's part of earlier *Socratica* (see Gigon's book cited in Note 42). In the present instance this assumption seems to furnish the best explanation. Ernst Gebhardt (*Polykrates' Anklage gegen Sokrates und Xenophon's Erwiderung*, Dissertation, Frankfurt, 1957), who protests against Gigon's procedure, suggests himself (100) that Xenophon has „aus früheren sokratischen Schriftstellern exzerpiert und unter bestimmten Stichworten gesammelt.“ He may have done so elsewhere but our section has a certain, albeit obscured, intrinsic coherence.

45) It is instructive to compare what Seneca de brev. vit. 12—14 says on the right and wrong kind of otium.

46) See further in this connection Isocr. 15. 302—304 (as well as a passage in the spurious *Demonicea* 18) and for the use of σχολή for "worthy" things also Xen. conv. 4.44.

preting this statement too narrowly as a philosophical dogma or doctrine; rather what Aristotle here is doing is to find some common ground between the philosophers and the non-philosophers<sup>47</sup>), a procedure in keeping with the argumentative method adopted in this chapter which operates much more with *ἔνδοξα* than on the strength of philosophical premises<sup>48</sup>).

About the esteem which *σχολή* enjoyed among the philosophers it will not be necessary to say much. The intimate connection of *σχολή* with contemplation and the cultivation of the intellectual excellences is self-evident. Plato's most emphatic endorsements of *σχολή* are found in the *Phaedo* and in the "digression" of the *Theaetetus*. The section of the *Phaedo* does not readily lend itself to a comparison with the passages of Euripides and Xenophon; for what Plato here says is radical and new. He correlates the opposition between *σχολή* and *ἀσχολία* with his soul-body dualism<sup>49</sup>), declaring the body to be responsible for all *ἀσχολία*. Another correlation of special interest to us is that between *ἀσχολία* and *τὰ ἀναγκαῖα* (= the care of the body and the *χρήματα* necessary for the body); we remember that in the *Politics* the opposition between *σχολή* and *ἀσχολία* was treated as parallel to that between *καλά* and *ἀναγκαῖα*<sup>50</sup>).

To judge by the *Phaedo*, withdrawal from political life — familiar to us from the *Ion* and the *Cyropaideia* — would only be the minimum withdrawal. The section referred to includes no mention of political *ἀσχολία* which is the theme and topic of the *Theaetetus* episode. Here Plato uses the strongest colors to draw a picture of the hurry, restlessness and anxiety that characterize all forms of political and ordinary civic life<sup>51</sup>). The philosopher living his life of sublime aloofness is said to be totally unfamiliar with all varieties of *ἀσχολία*. *Σχολή* and

47) Here I find myself in complete agreement with Stocks, op. cit. 180.

48) Stocks loc. cit. rightly speaks of a "review of *ἔνδοξα*". To supply a few details, I should for *συνεχυστάτη* (1177 a 21) refer to *Rhet.* 1364 b 30, for *ἡθονή* (a 23 ff.) to *Rhet.* 1364 b 23, 27, 1365 b 11, for the *αὐτάρκεια* motif (a 27 f.) to *Rhet.* 1362 a 27, for 1177 a 28 ff. to *Rhet.* 1364 a 5 ff., for *δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι* (b 1) to *Rhet.* 1362 a 21 ff.; 1364 a 1 ff. But it would not be correct to call Aristotle's argumentation in X, 7 "rhetorical".

49) *Phaedo* 66 b—d.

50) See above p. 197.

51) See esp. *Theaet.* 172 d—176 a. On *σχολή* in *Polit.* 272 d 9 see my comments in *Entretiens sur l'antiqu. class. VII (Hésiode et son influence, Geneva, 1962) 207.*



ἀσχολία as described in the Theaetetus are no longer two phases of life but two mutually exclusive forms of life. All values — all ἀγαθὰ — are on the side of σχολή, which is not only the φιλτάτων but also the τιμιώτατον<sup>52)</sup>.

We hardly need this extreme formulation of the contrast to realize that σχολή and the political scene are incompatible. To introduce σχολή into the blueprint of an ideal state and make it the τέλος of the citizens' life, as Aristotle does in the Politics, would seem the height of paradox (not to lose our sense of proportions we may, however, recall the even more extreme paradoxa of Plato's Republic). Σχολή as something for which the law-giver has to make provision is definitely the idea of a political 'reformer' — and yet we do well to bear in mind that it met a desire which, whether widespread or not, was in any case not confined to the philosophers. Θεωρία was a new form of "leisure", but not the only form, and we have now to consider whether Plato and Aristotle wished to make this kind of σχολή<sup>53)</sup> a part of the ordinary citizen's experience.

To come to the main point at once, while both philosophers go to great length in legislating about the citizens' conduct, only Aristotle's legislation reflects the new appreciation of leisure as an essential part of life. In Plato's Republic there is σχολή — but it is σχολή with a genitive: the farmer is to have σχολή of the shoemaker's work etc.<sup>54)</sup>. It stands to reason that if everybody keeps strictly to "his own work" life would have a less hurried pace than in the existing Greek cities. But this does not mean that for σχολή as such a place is secured; on the contrary we may say that in a city where life is so much less restless and less nervous the psychological and political atmosphere which normally created the need for σχολή would not exist. As far as we can judge, σχολή with its implications of privacy and withdrawal is a condition of the philosopher's life and of the philosopher's "school" that Plato has no intention of incorporating into his city.

52) cf. A. J. Festugière's beautiful book *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (2nd ed., Paris, 1950).

53) Stocks op. cit. 181 says that "the steps by which (σχολή) came to mean . . . school are obscure". I see no reason for being so despondent. Evidently whenever the philosophers of the Academy or the Lyceum met they were ἐν σχολῇ. Note in this connection Arist. Pol. VII, 1.1328b39: a subject not germane to the Politics is to be left to ἑτέρα σχολή.

54) Resp. II, 370b ff., 374b ff., e.

In the Laws even more specific regulations are provided for the citizens' upbringing and education. Since Plato was engaged on the Laws during the years while Aristotle was a member of the Academy and since he is in this work closer to the realities of Greek life, scholars have rightly come to think that for a point by point comparison with Aristotle's best *πολιτεία* the Laws offer better material than the Republic<sup>55</sup>. Yet in the subject of *σχολή* the Laws show no approximation to Politics VII and VIII. Granted that Plato speaks of his new city as enjoying "the greatest amount of leisure" or a leisure "the like of which no other city knows"<sup>56</sup>, this is still not the same as to make leisure the controlling value or the *τέλος* of the citizens' life. *Σχολή* is never analyzed in the Laws, its right and wrong uses are never discussed. It is treated neither as an ideal nor as a phase *sui generis* in the citizens' daily life. Aristotle's exaltation of *σχολή* as *τέλος* and as *σκοπός* of education has no antecedent in the Laws. While Koller is correct in holding that Aristotle's formula "*ἀσχολία* for the sake of *σχολή*" took shape as a parallel to Plato's "war for the sake of peace"<sup>57</sup>, he errs in ignoring the important differences between Plato's and Aristotle's respective conceptions of *σχολή*. For since Aristotle makes of *σχολή* a separate phase in the citizens' life, whereas in the Laws it is rather the atmosphere (or a factor in the atmosphere) of this life, it is misleading to say that the „*mußhaft-glückliche Dasein der Politen* (scil. in Aristotle's Books VII and VIII) *prinzipiell das Staats- und Lebensideal der Νόμοι zum Vorbild hat*"<sup>58</sup>. Plato wants his citizens to be unhurried and unharassed; they are not to be oppressed by a great variety of duties nor to be confused by mutually conflicting influences<sup>59</sup>. But he certainly does not

55) See esp. the two articles of Willy Theiler, *Mus. Helv.* 9 (1952), 65 ff. and *Schweiz. Arch. f. Volkskunde* 47 (1951) 192, esp. n. 15, but also Koller's study and Glenn R. Morrow's important book *Plato's Cretan City* (Princeton, 1960 *passim*) as well as his contribution to *Aristotle and Plato in Mid-Fourth Century* ed. I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (Göteborg, 1960) 145 ff., 160 ff.

56) *Legg.* VIII, 828 d; 831 c ff.; 832 d. Note however that in the last passages leisure is thought of as appropriate to „education“ and „play.“

57) *op. cit.* 19.

58) Koller 35 f. Koller underrated Aristotle's originality also on p. 19. In particular Aristotle's rigid separation of leisure and play (see below pp. 211 ff.) has no antecedent in Plato.

59) On more specific reasons (absence of greed etc.) given by Plato 813 c ff. for the prevalence of *σχολή* see Koller 10.

legislate for men and women who feel the need for withdrawal and privacy. His aim is to preserve the traditional pattern of Greek life, and it is in accord with this pattern that he distinguishes two main phases in the citizens' life, *σπουδή* and *παιδιά*<sup>60</sup>).

"Play" (*παιδιά*) in the Laws has a wide range. It covers every form of relaxation (the right form of relaxation being of profound concern for the law-giver), including gymnastic and music, dance in its numerous and for Plato very important varieties<sup>61</sup>), but also the symposium which in the Laws has the essential function of testing and strengthening the character; for no wise legislator would regard wine as outside his province. Public choruses, festivals of a semi-public and public type, and much else that pertains to the cult of the gods may not be items that suggest themselves to our mind as good examples of "play" but they certainly have their place in the context of relaxation (*ἀνάπαυλα*)<sup>62</sup>) which cannot be separated from play. This in fact had been their place long before Plato; in Pericles' Funeral Oration we read: *καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν πόνων πλείστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπορισάμεθα, ἀγῶσι μὲν γὰρ καὶ θυσίαις διετησίαις νομιζόντες*<sup>63</sup>). What is essentially new in Plato's treatment of *παιδιά* is that he fashions it with reference to *σπουδή*. Beginning with the earliest form in which it materializes, i. e. with the play of children, he treats it as habit- and character-forming. The earlier in life a future citizen develops the habits of rejoicing and grieving at the right things<sup>64</sup>), the better are his chances of growing up into the right kind of person and developing the moral ex-

60) Of the many passages referring to *σπουδή* and *παιδιά* it will suffice to cite I, 643 b; V, 732 d; VI, 761 d; VII, 797 b; 798 b ff.; XII, 942 a. On VII, 803 d see below note 66. Books II and VII as well as the first part of VIII are devoted to a discussion of „play“ in its numerous varieties. On the element of *παιδιά* in Plato's own writings — on the face of it a different subject — cf. De Vries' book (cited above n. 9). The conception of human life as a *παιδιά* did not inspire Plato's literary use of *παιδιά*: still, this conception, however late its origin, gives us some kind of perspective on playfulness, humour, jest and satire in Plato's dialogues.

61) On dance in the Laws see the illuminating discussion of Glenn R. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City, 358 ff.

62) For the festivals cf. Morrow 352 ff.

63) Thuc. II, 38.1. Cf. Legg. II, 653 cf. Note also the association of sacrifice and play Legg. VII, 803 d f. and VIII, 829 b ff.

64) See e. g. I, 643 b ff.; II, 653 b. Cf. Jaeger, Paideia (Engl. ed.) III, 227.

cellences that the city needs. But it is not only the plays and games of children that are to be regarded as preludes to the seriousness of life; in other contexts too, e. g. while dealing with dance and festivals, Plato makes clear that play and the serious part of life — σπουδή which includes activities of war as well as of peace — stand to each other in the relation of means to end<sup>65</sup>).

A passage of Book VII (803 d) in which Plato speaks of the relation between "play" and "seriousness" is remarkable because he here connects this relation with that between war and peace. The prevailing opinion from which he dissents is that serious work is necessary for the sake of play (ἐνεκα τῶν παιδιῶν). "For they think that the serious business of war must be properly handled for the sake of peace"<sup>66</sup>). What Plato considers wrong with this view is not at all that it regards peace rather than war as the end but that it considers war mankind's most serious business. Plato himself would prefer to think of education as mankind's σπουδαιότατον. As early as in the First Book he has made clear that his city is not, like Sparta, to be oriented toward war<sup>67</sup>). But he cannot, of course, equate or compare war with play or say that play relates to serious work as war does to peace. He cannot — and need not — meet the formula that σπουδή relates to παιδιά

65) VI, 771 e; VII, 796 a—d.

66) VII, 803 d. Are we to think that such an opinion regarding the relation of σπουδή and παιδιά was actually held and professed by people or is Plato formulating a principle on which the majority of his contemporaries appear to him to be acting? I am not sure how to answer this question. Aristotle repeatedly (Pol. VIII, 2.1337b35; 5.1339b31 f.; Eth. Nic. X, 6.1176b16 ff., 27 ff., 32) rejects the notion that play or relaxation is the goal, without ever explicitly asserting that this opinion had its advocates and defenders. To the philosophers it would surely appear that most people knew nothing better than to amuse themselves. It was after all only Aristotle who insisted that leisure and "play" could have no truck with one another (in the passage of the Memorabilia discussed above p. 202 f. the "better" and "worse" occupations of leisure correspond to Aristotle's σχολή and παιδιά). The relation between Legg. 803 c2 ff. and Aristotle's argument in Eth. Nic. 1176 b 27 ff. has been misunderstood by J. B. England (The Laws of Plato, 2 vols., Manchester, 1920, ad 803 d) and by De Vries (op. cit. 26 n. 18) both of whom think that Aristotle polemizes against Plato (Legg. 803 cff.). How different the παιδιά criticized by Aristotle is from Plato's concept in our passage becomes clear if we go back to 1176 b 9 where Aristotle's scrutiny begins.

67) Legg. I, 625 dff.; see e. g. 628 c9 ff. — For what follows cf. 803 c2 — e4.



as war does to peace by an alternative and better formula. He does say *παίζοντα διαβιωτέον τινὰς δὴ παιδίας* <sup>68)</sup>, which surely does not mean that he approximates the outlook of those who make *παιδιά* the end of *σπουδή*. For this, as we have seen, is the outlook which he opposes; and he has good reasons for opposing it. Not only is there much seriousness and serious purpose in the "plays" which he here discusses — education, music, cultic practices — but his disquisition is at this point dominated by the idea that man is a "plaything of god" and only god but not man *ἄξιος σπουδῆς*. As so often in the *Laws*, Plato complicates the problem by discussing it on more than one plane and looking at it in more than one perspective. Thus he can in one and the same breath say: *παίζοντα ὅτι καλλίστας παιδίας . . . οὕτω διαβιῶναι* (*δει*) and declare his view to be the opposite of that which makes *παιδιά* the end of life. However if we wish to find a basis for a comparison with Aristotle, we must, hard as it may be, leave Plato's "metaphysical" perspective out of consideration and say that since for him the *ἀνθρώπινον σπουδαῖον* coincides with *παιδιαί* he cannot bring serious business and play into a relation that would correspond to that between war and peace. Symmetry does not matter for him; it would in fact be incongruous on the "theological" level to which he has shifted the issue.

We have already seen that Aristotle knows the right and symmetrical formula: "We are busy that we may have leisure and make war that we may live in peace" <sup>69)</sup>. This proposition is found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as well as in Book VII of the *Politics* <sup>70)</sup>. Evidently the substitution of leisure for play makes all the difference in this point but we may at once generalize and say that it makes all the difference for Aristotle's regulation of the citizens' life. For if the principle "we are busy that we may have leisure" holds good not only in the *Ethics* but also in the *Politics* *σχολή* must be the most valuable phase also in the life of the citizen <sup>71)</sup>. While Plato in the *Laws*

68) 803 e 1; cf. 803 e 7, where the connection with the θεοῦ παίγνιον motif is obvious.

69) See above p. 197 f.

70) *Eth. Nic. X.* 7.1177 b 4 ff.; *Pol. VII*, 14.1333 a 30 ff.; 15.1334 a 14 ff. (cf. VIII, 2.1337 b 30 ff.).

71) See also *Pol. VII*, 14.1333 a 30: the whole of life is divided into business and leisure and into war and peace, and the latter items are the οὐ ἐνεχα of the former.



preserves the traditional pattern of Greek life with its division of life into serious work and play, Aristotle breaks with this pattern, attempting what we may call a reorganization of Greek life. For him *σχολή* is the end; if the citizens do not find it or do not put it to the right use they cannot attain happiness. Obviously Aristotle's conception of the citizen's happiness must differ considerably from Plato's and he must depart from Plato in many other value judgments and legislative provisions for the best state, if *σχολή* is so basic for his scheme. His outlook in this important matter is indeed more "modern."

Having traced the *σχολή* motif through Book VII of the *Politics*, we have still to consider the central doctrines of Book VIII and should now be in a better position to appraise their significance. What we must constantly bear in mind is that *σχολή* was exalted by the philosophers but not only by the philosophers. As we have seen, the philosophers "fell in" with a trend. Their own specific contribution consists in the emphatic association of *σχολή* with the *βίος θεωρητικός*. The decisive argument of *Eth. Nic.* X, 7, to which we have repeatedly made reference<sup>72</sup>), states in effect that if general opinion is right in connecting happiness with *σχολή* the intellectual life (as cultivated by the philosophers) and the intellectual *ἀρετή* must be the consummation of happiness. For Aristotle who had seen mathematics thrive in the "leisure" of the Academy<sup>73</sup>) it was entirely natural to suppose (as he does in the first chapter of the *Metaphysics*)<sup>74</sup>) that pure science originated in the country — scil. Egypt — which was the first to produce conditions of leisure and even something in the nature of a leisure class. It was natural too for him, we may assume, to think of the deity as enjoying *σχολή*. For God's only activity is thought, and although *Metaphysics* Λ includes no definite statement regarding God's leisure — i. e. nothing as definite and positive as the Epicurean affirmations about this subject<sup>75</sup>) — there is, to make up for this lack, a very

72) See above p. 193 and p. 204 f.

73) Cf. Proclus in *Eucl. prolog.* 2.66.8—68.4 Friedl. For *σχολή* and the progress of mathematical and philosophical studies cf. *Arist. Protrep.* 5 a (30, 31 Walzer; 34 Ross) and 8.

74) *Metaph.* A 1, 981 b 20 ff. For the *σχολή* of the Egyptian priests cf. also *Isocr. Bus.* 21 (to which Helen North has drawn my attention).

75) See *Cic. de nat. deor.* 1.51 f.

revealing remark in *de caelo* II, 1, where Aristotle rejects the Platonic conception of a divine world soul on the ground that the activity of such a soul would be *ἄσχυλος καὶ πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένη ῥαστώνης ἔμφορος*.<sup>76</sup>) For his own god, we may take it, Aristotle has secured the opposite of *ἀσχυλία*. Our question, then, will be how far we can recognize the features of the philosopher's *βίος θεωρητικός* in the leisure of *Politics* VIII.

We were in Book VII led to expect that education would furnish the citizens with the means of putting their leisure to good and constructive use. This expectation is fully borne out in Book VIII. But before we reach the stage where formal education takes over, we see the children pass through a period of *παιδιά*, and may notice that Aristotle while dealing with this period shows a very Platonic concern that the children's games should be "neither unfit for a free man nor laborious nor ill mannered"; he also makes it a duty of the officials to exercise care regarding the tales and stories that the children are to hear since "all such things should prepare the way for their later pursuits" just as "most of the games should be imitations of what is later to be done in seriousness."<sup>77</sup>) All this is in complete conformity with the outlook of the *Laws* but provides no opening yet for *σχολή*.

The *σχολή* motif appears as soon as Aristotle turns to the formal education acquired in the later years of youth. Examining the subjects normally taught — writing, athletics, music, and painting — Aristotle decides that music is by far the best of them.<sup>78</sup>) It answers to his idea of a truly liberal education (literally: the education worthy of a free man). A liberal education must be distinguished from a "practical" education which teaches men "useful and much used" things. The latter kind of education is related to the "necessities" of life and may even have the effect of rendering its recipient "banauistic"<sup>79</sup>). In Aristotle's opinion writing and painting represent this practical or useful type of education. Athletics comes off somewhat better because it fosters the excellence of courage. But we know that this is not one of the excellences associated with leisure. Music is the only subject of education that can be related to these excellences but everything depends

76) *de caelo* II, 1.284 a 29 ff.

77) VII, 15.1336 a 28 ff., 32 ff.

78) VIII, 2.1337 b 23 ff.

79) *Ibid.* 25 ff.

on selecting the right kind of music and deciding in what spirit it is to be taught, practiced, and listened to.

In our days, Aristotle says, most people cultivate music because of the pleasure they derive from it<sup>80</sup>). The ancients were wiser in realizing that music must have a place in education "because nature itself, as has often been said, seeks not only the right ways of engaging in business (*ἀσχολία*) but also of occupying one's leisure nobly"<sup>81</sup>).

The next sentences once more insist on the fundamental distinction between leisure and play (*παιδιά*). If they were identical play would be the end of life which is of course impossible (we remember however that in the *Laws* we read of people who think that serious work is done for the sake of play)<sup>82</sup>). Still, to reject the identification of play with leisure is not the same as to deny play a useful and important function in the life of the adult. Play is necessary because everybody who is busy needs relaxation, and the law-giver will do well to provide for relaxation at the right time<sup>83</sup>). Aristotle does not here specify what form the relaxation is to take — we may suppose that the festivals to which Plato and Thucydides refer as relaxation would have such a function also in Aristotle's scheme, and as we read on in Book VIII we learn that even some kind of music is to be welcomed for play and relaxation<sup>84</sup>). But it is not the same kind that should be practiced in *σχολή*, and it soon becomes perfectly clear that *σχολή* is not at all a time for relaxation. It is to serve a much

80) *Ibid.* 28 f.

81) *Ibid.* 29 ff.

82) *Ibid.* 35 ff. (cf. above p. 209).

83) *Ibid.* 40. For *ἀνάπαυλα* (*ἀνάπαυσις*) see above p. 208. The religious motif dominant in Plato and barely suggested by Thucydides is absent in Aristotle.

84) VIII, 5.1339b10 ff.; cf. 25. What Aristotle means to say in the sentence b27—31 does not emerge as long as we read with the Mss. in 30 *χρήσιμον ἂν εἴη διαναπαύειν ἐν ταῖς ἀπό ταύτης* (scil. τῆς μουσικῆς) *ἡδοναῖς*. Briefly, — for it is not possible to write out here all that is relevant — Aristotle does not wish to establish the useful quality (*χρήσιμον*) of *διαναπαύειν* — an awkward transitive verb not used elsewhere without an object — but of music. I take music here as below b41 (where Ross unnecessarily adds a *δοτι*; read *οὐ[διά] ταύτην μόνην*) to be the subject of *χρήσιμον* and propose to change *ΔΙΑΝΑΠΑΥΕΙΝ* to *ΔΙ' ΑΝΑΠΑΥΣΙΝ*. Cf. *πρός τὰς ἀναπαύσεις* 41 f.; *παιδιάς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως* 1339 a 16; note also *τὴν εἰρημὴν χρεῖαν* 1340 a 2 at the point where Aristotle moves on from the *χρήσιμον* of music to its nobler function.

higher purpose<sup>85</sup>). Aristotle actually puts play and serious work (or business) on one and the same side, assigning to play the function of relieving the tensions of *ἀσχολία*, while on the other side he places *σχολή*, remaining true to his conviction that it is the end and goal; for it is here that we have to look for human excellence and human happiness<sup>86</sup>). Aristotle's radical departure from Plato's scheme — and from the traditional Greek pattern — becomes more and more evident. To put the matter schematically, instead of the Platonic dichotomy

$\swarrow$        $\searrow$   
 παιδιά    σπουδή

we have a new division of life:

$\swarrow$        $\searrow$   
 ἀσχολία    σχολή<sup>87</sup>

(interrupted by *παιδιά*)

We must not forget that throughout Book VIII education continues to be Aristotle's subject. The radical separation of "play" and "leisure" is germane to this subject because education in music may be thought of as training a person either for the hours of play or for those of leisure, it being understood that, unlike the art of writing and other "necessary" subjects, it cannot be of use in "business". In Aristotle's

85) Ibid. b39 ff. it is suggested that the use made of music for „play“ is something accidental (*συμβέβηκε* 1340 a 1; cf. 1339 b 31 ff.), „yet the nature of music is of higher worth (*τιμιωτέρα* 1340 a 1).

86) VIII, 2.1337 b 37: „play should rather have its place during the time while we are busy; for a man who works hard needs relaxation (*ἀνάπαυσις*)“; cf. *ibid.* 40—1338 a 9 and the argument of VIII, 5 where the value of music in the time of play and recreation is admitted (1339 b 14—42) before the discussion concentrates on its nobler function. — To judge by 1339 b 22 f., social gatherings, symposia etc. would for Aristotle find their place under „play“.

87) It may be well to emphasize that the differentiation between *παιδιά* and *σχολή* which is of cardinal importance in Aristotle's scheme would seem artificial to the great majority of his contemporaries. We may note with amusement that Heraclides Creticus (?) in his guide book of Greek cities (*περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι πόλεων* ed. Friedrich Pfister, Sitzungsber. Wien. Akad., 227.2, 1951) includes among the attractions of Athens the „relaxation“ (*ἀνάπαυσις*) provided by the lectures of philosophers, while using the word *σχολή* for other entertainments (I, 1.72.15 Pf.) whose nature he does not specify but which, one may suspect, Aristotle would rather class under *παιδιά*. Pfister seems right in placing this work in the later half of the third century but the author's lack of respect for the philosophers is not the only reason which makes me doubtful regarding Pfister's attempt to affiliate him with the Peripatus.

opinion the usefulness of music in *παιδιά* would hardly justify the effort which goes into learning to play an instrument; one might as well be content with listening to professionals who are likely to possess greater skill in it than an amateur<sup>88</sup>). But when we think of the great value which music has for our leisure the musical education of the young becomes fully justified<sup>89</sup>).

The reason why music is such an ideal occupation for the citizen's leisure is that it moulds and strengthens the character. But only the right kind of music will have this highly desirable effect. The selection of the right rhythms and melodies is so important that proposals for an ideal state must include directives for it. In addressing himself to this task Aristotle proceeds on certain basic assumptions for which he would hardly claim originality. Music is in a higher degree than any other art an imitation of characters; it expresses the various character qualities more directly and effectively than any other art (it is however surprising that Aristotle in this connection only compares music with the visual arts, making no reference at all to poetry)<sup>90</sup>). Anger and its opposite, calmness, courage, self-control and again their opposite "ethical" conditions all find their best likenesses in the melodies and rhythms<sup>91</sup>). And if such "likenesses" or "imitations" have the effect of making the listener *συμπαθής*, i. e. producing in him the same ethical condition, it is evident that music, being the best likeness, has this effect in a particularly high degree. To some harmonies we respond by becoming more mournful and restrained, to others by letting ourselves more readily go; and what is true of the harmonies holds good of the rhythms too<sup>92</sup>). The assumption which underlies Aristotle's entire

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88) VIII, 4.1339a31 ff. The question whether it does not suffice to listen with understanding and judgment to the performance of professionals arises also when music is discussed as the appropriate occupation for leisure. Aristotle returns to it in VIII, 6 where he argues that some practicing is desirable but makes clear that a person of liberal education should not aim at the degree of proficiency attained by professional musicians. Cf. Koller 110 ff., esp. 112 f.

89) See esp. VIII, 5.1340b12.

90) Ibid. 1340a30 ff., 38 ff. I should read in a 38 *ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτῶν* (*αὐτοῖς* codd.) *ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν*. Cf. the contrasting statement in a 32 f. [See now Rudolf Kassel, *Hermes* 91, 1963, 54 f.]

91) Ibid. 1340a18 ff., 38 ff., b7 ff.

92) 1340a40 ff., b7 ff.



train of reasoning is the same which Plato in the Republic expresses somewhat more strongly: κυριωτάτη <ἡ> ἐν μουσικῇ τροφῇ ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἡ ἄρμονία καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἄπτεται αὐτῆς; for although Aristotle nowhere here makes the lasting effect of education through music quite so clear he certainly shares this Platonic conviction<sup>93</sup>). Neither *μίμησις* nor *συμπάθεια* is a new concept, and that education should create habits of rejoicing and grieving at the right kind of thing — i. e. first of all at the right kind of music — is the educational principle repeatedly affirmed in the *Laws*<sup>94</sup>). What is new in the discussion of the *Politics* is the orientation of this entire complex of ideas toward *σχολή*. It is not astonishing however — given the origin of this complex — that Aristotle here actually dwells on the effects produced by music in education and says relatively little about its value for leisure. His views are nevertheless clear enough; music is so valuable and so productive of *ἀρετή* and happiness because when practiced or enjoyed in *σχολή* it fosters the right ethical disposition. To find a content for *σχολή* which he has so strictly set apart from “play” Aristotle has evidently drawn upon what Plato (and others) had said about the effect of music on the *ἦθη*. It is an interesting matter for speculation whether — with the help of his *κάθαρσις* theory — he could have given poetry a similar place in the citizens’ leisure.

It is in accord with the *Ethics* that also the finest pleasure is caused by the music which produces *ἀρεταί*; for the purest pleasures are concomitants of the most valuable human activities<sup>95</sup>). Still this effect of music is ethical, not intellectual; in the terms of Aristotle’s system it relates to the moral rather than to the intellectual virtues. Had Aristotle really, as it is alleged, carried the ideal of the philosopher into the life of the citizens, the occupation recommended for their leisure would not be music and the virtues and capacities to be developed in the leisure hours would not be the moral but the intellectual.

93) *Resp.* III, 401 d; cf. *Aristot.*, *Pol.* VIII, 4.1339 a 23 ff.

94) See the passages cited above n. 64 (the same thought occurs however also *Resp.* III, 401 e). Cf. *Pol.* VIII, 5.1340 a 14 ff., 23 f.; *Eth. Nic.* II, 3.1104 b 11 ff.

95) *VIII*, 4.1339 b 32 f.; *Eth. Nic.* X, 4—6 (5.1176 a 10; 6.1176 b 19 ff.).

Aristotle's views regarding the effects of music have been excellently analyzed by Koller and as our own interest in these views is limited to whatever light they shed on *σχολή* we need not go farther into the subject of these effects. Instead, we may consider once more the prominent standing given to *σχολή* in Aristotle's political theory. From an historical point of view, what is the significance of this new approach? We have seen that the law-giver has to make provisions for the leisure of the citizens because he has to make provisions for their *εὐδαιμονία*. Leisure is the *τέλος* of the citizens' life — but it also seems to be the least political phase of their existence. οὐδὲ γρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως Aristotle says<sup>96</sup>) with uncompromising rigor (as though he wished to leave no doubt that he remains not an inch behind Plato's extreme position) and yet it is as citizen and as a part of the city that the individual receives an education which guarantees the happiness and valuable occupation of his private hours. This seems "liberal", even if Aristotle's political doctrine, as the statement just quoted shows, is certainly not liberal in intention. As a philosopher (and member of the Academy) Aristotle must have learned to value *σχολή* and may have convinced himself that without *σχολή* man does not realize his best potentialities. Yet the *σχολή* which Aristotle establishes in his best state is not the philosophical or intellectual variety (for we have to form our opinion on the basis of what he actually says, not on hypotheses as to what he may have said in chapters that are lost or would have said in chapters that were never written)<sup>97</sup>).

96) VIII, 1.1337a27.

97) I have no intention to minimize the relevance of VIII, 3.1338a32 ff., which allows for the possibility that other forms of *παιδεία* may be as valuable as music. What Aristotle here has in mind may be mathematics but equally well, if not more probably, poetry. In view of this uncertainty and of our ignorance regarding his final judgment about such other subject(s) of education I do not see why this passage should cause us to qualify our conclusions (nor does 1338b4f. help us any farther). On the basic question whether Aristotle left the theory of the best constitution incomplete or whether the incomplete condition is due to accidents of transmission we have no means of reaching a decision. I am sensitive to the force of H. von Arnim's observation (Sitzungsber. Wien. Akad. 200, 1924.1.82) that his theory „in diesem Stile (scil. of Books VII and VIII) weitergeführt, sehr umfangreich geworden wäre“ (cf. *ibid.* 16) and incline to agree with his conclusion. For it is not easy to believe that several additional books were worked out and disappeared without leaving a trace — but if difficult to imagine, it still is not impossible.

Aristotle clearly makes allowance for the fact that the majority of citizens, even by his rather selective definition of citizen status, are not philosophers and would not find their happiness in theoretical pursuits. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* the proposition *δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι* serves as common ground between the philosophers and large segments of the remainder of the population: in *Politics* VII and VIII, he provides for the *σχολή* and *εὐδαιμονία* not of philosophers but of citizens the best content that he can find without either demanding the impossible or surrendering his standards of value. He also meets the realities of the situation by recognizing that leisure — and *ἀρεταί* — are available only to those who are not absorbed in the struggle for their livelihood<sup>98</sup>). It is easy but hardly fair to trace his statements on this subject to political, economic or class prejudice<sup>99</sup>) and to treat his concern with the fostering of *ἀρεταί* as a rationalization of such prejudice. Rather the conviction that whoever lives the life of a free man can do nothing better than to aim at the realization of the *ἀρεταί* is inherent in the civic tradition; here again this tradition and the philosophers' tenets find

98) The most important passage is probably VII, 9.1329 a 1 (on which see however above note 19). At VII, 15.1334 a 20 Aristotle quotes the proverb *οὐ σχολῇ δούλοισ;* the context of the passage and the purpose for which the proverb is introduced should discourage the idea that this is a „give-away“ of his social bias. That *βάνασσοι* cannot enjoy leisure and that it presupposes a certain economic independence is indeed Aristotle's opinion; but to treat his statements as a rationalization (see note 99) cannot be easy, since so many other ethical propositions are involved, and *σχολή* as we have seen, is for Aristotle not a class privilege but an essential condition of the philosophical life. What might suggest class prejudice is that Aristotle's political scheme as far as we know it does not, like Plato's, provide for „social mobility“. But here too alternative explanations are available.

99) Stocks op. cit. 180—182 does not go to such extremes, but he takes too simple a view of „all the philosophers had to do“ (scil. to „transmute the social prejudice“, 182). His simplification is partly due to his failure to perceive the philosophers' own genuine need and enthusiasm for *σχολή* (hence his curious opinion that the concept is a stranger in their systems; see note 4, and his no less curious difficulty to understand how the word came to denote the philosophical schools; see note 53). There is „social prejudice“ in the „digression“ of the *Theaetetus*, yet how much else that there is in it must be ignored to make the „prejudice“ the basis for interpretation. In fairness it should be said that criticism of Aristotle's attitude does not always take the naive form of blaming him for not looking at the political and social scene in the spirit of doctrines current in the 19th and 20th centuries.

common ground (*ἔλευθερία* is not, as it seemed to be in the "digression" of the *Theaetetus*<sup>100</sup>), a monopoly of the philosophers).

Music as recommended by Aristotle would not be a "cultural pursuit" in our sense of the word. It is meant to contribute to the ethical improvement of the citizens; and if the better music strengthens their *ἀνδρεία*, *σωφροσύνη* etc. we might even incline to think that it will make them better citizens. But this is not what Aristotle himself emphasizes. In whatever way we may look at his arguments, we are left with the impression that he is genuinely interested in the private happiness of the citizens, which, to be sure, will be the happiness not of a *βάνανσος* but of a cultivated person with a potential for *ἀρετή*. It is impossible to gauge how many people of the fourth century may have taken so civilized a view of their leisure and may have earnestly desired to spend it in some *καλά*<sup>101</sup>. If we wish to be realistic we had better not suppose that a rigid distinction between *παιδιά* and *σχολή* was known or observed outside philosophical circles.

*Σχολή* was the best part of life for those who in the fourth and the following centuries would rather join a philosophical school than participate in the political affairs of their city, and it probably was the better part for those who did both. *Σχολή* was the haven for scholars, scientists, and poets. May there not also have been people who preferred the quiet enjoyment of music and literature to participation in the civic life? This question should be raised, although if there were such people they have no voice by which to speak to us — those who do speak to us in New Comedy would not quite measure up to Aristotle's standard of *τὰ καλά*. However the non-political character of New Comedy is one of many indications that happiness was now more frankly associated with the privacy of life. This is the sphere on which Aristotle's discussion of leisure focuses, and if we call this attitude to happiness Hellenistic, we may here find a reason for regarding Aristotle's conception of *σχολή* as in accord with tendencies of the Hellenistic rather than of the classical period. Although dealing with the material of the past — which historian does

100) See esp. *Theaet.* 175 d7 ff.

101) For Aristotle's view of the *καλά* in education see also VIII, 3.1338 a 37—b 4.



otherwise? — he is not insensitive to “the shape of things to come”. To criticize him because his system has no place for large empires is to assume that large empires were all, or were the best, that the Hellenistic centuries produced.

Much of what we read in Books VII and VIII is presented as a legislation for *σχολή*. Given the scheme of the *Politics*, it was natural for Aristotle to adopt the legislative “form.” We need not now consider how adequate it is for his purpose of preserving in a new pattern of life as much as was possible of the Hellenic tradition. This tradition is for him epitomized in the concept of *ἀρετή*; the new pattern is what I have ventured to call Hellenistic. The conventional statements to the effect that as a political theorist Aristotle is wholly looking backward may well be in need of qualification. So, I admit, is my own suggestion that the emphasis on *σχολή* shows sympathy with “Hellenistic” tendencies. To the qualifications contained elsewhere in this paper I readily add here at the end two more. There was political apathy in the fourth century<sup>102</sup>), and there were lively and indeed fervent manifestations of the civic spirit in the Hellenistic period<sup>103</sup>). Yet in spite of all arguments for continuity, it makes sense and is necessary to define the relations of Aristotle's school and *σχολή* with the spirit of the Hellenistic centuries.

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102) Demosthenes in his references to this apathy or lethargy sometimes uses the word *σχολή* with the implication that the citizens are unwilling to arouse themselves to energetic political action (see esp. 8.53; 10.54 *σχολή και ἡσυχία*; 18.45). Needless to say this is not the meaning which the word has in Aristotle's books on the best constitution, nor could the attitude which Demosthenes castigates have met with Aristotle's approval (see VII, 15.1334 a 18—23).

103) Cf. e. g. M. Rostovtzeff's vigorous statements to the effect that the *homo politicus* is not extinct in this period (*Soc. and Econ. History of the Hellenistic World*, Oxford 1941, 1119 ff.).